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ABSTRACT
UNIVERSALLY SELECTION-CLOSED
FAMILIES OF SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS
S¸ENOCAK, Talat
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray
January 2009
In this thesis, we introduce a new notion of consistency for families of social
choice functions, called selection-closedness. This concept requires that every
member of a family of social choice functions that are to be employed by a
society to make its choice from an alternative set it faces, should choose a
member of the given family, when it is also employed to choose the social
choice function itself in the presence of other rival such functions along with
the members of the initial family. We show that a proper subset of neutral
social choice functions is universally selection-closed if and only if it is a subset
of the set of dictatorial and anti-dictatorial social choice functions. Finally, we
introduce a weaker version of selection-closedness and conclude that a “right-
extendable scoring correspondence” is strict if and only if the set consisting
of its singleton valued refinements is universally weakly selection-closed.
Keywords: Social Choice, Self-selectivity, Selection-Closed, Weakly Selection-
Closed, Scoring Correspondence.
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O¨ZET
EVRENSEL SEC¸MEDE-KAPALI SOSYAL SEC¸I˙M
FONKSI˙YONU AI˙LELERI˙
S¸ENOCAK, Talat
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Semih Koray
Ocak 2009
Bu tez c¸alıs¸mamızda, yeni bir tutarlılık o¨lc¸u¨tu¨ olarak, sec¸mede-kapalılık kavramı
sunulmaktadır. Bir toplulukc¸a verili bir sec¸enek ku¨mesinden sec¸im yapmada
kullanılacak olan sosyal sec¸im kurallarından olus¸an bir ku¨menin sec¸mede-
kapalı olması ic¸in, bu ku¨menin herhangi bir u¨yesinin, sosyal sec¸im kuralının
kendisinin, bu ku¨menin ic¸indeki ve dıs¸ındaki baz sec¸me kuralları arasından
sec¸ilmesinde kullanılması durumunda, sec¸ilen kuralın bas¸langıc¸taki ku¨meye
ait olması gerekmektedir. No¨tr (sec¸enekler u¨zerinden permu¨tasyonlar altında
deg˘is¸mez olan) sosyal sec¸im kuralları ku¨mesinin herhangi bir has alt ku¨mesinin
evrensel sec¸mede-kapalı olmasının ancak ve ancak diktato¨rlu¨k ve kars¸ı dik-
tato¨rlu¨klerden olus¸an ku¨menin bir alt ku¨mesi olmasıyla mu¨mku¨n olacag˘ı
go¨sterilmis¸tir. Son olarak ise, sec¸mede-kapalılıg˘ın zayıflatılmıs¸ bir bic¸imi
sunulmus¸ ve herhangi bir “sag˘-uzatmalı derecelendirme ku¨me deg˘erli sosyal
sec¸im fonksiyonunun” kuvvetli olabilmesinin ancak ve ancak so¨z konusu ku-
ralın tek deg˘erli bu¨tu¨n inceltmelerini ic¸eren ku¨menin bu zayıf sec¸mede-kapalılık
kos¸ulunu sag˘lamasıyla mu¨mku¨n olacag˘ı go¨sterilmis¸tir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Sec¸im, Kendini-sec¸erlik, sec¸mede-kapalılık, zayıf
sec¸mede-kapalılık, derecelendirme ku¨me deg˘erli fonksiyonu.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Self-selectivity is a kind of consistency pertaining to social choice functions
introduced by Koray (2000). We imagine that a society that faces a choice
problem on a finite non-empty set A of alternatives is also to choose the
social choice function (SCF) that will be used in making the choice from
A. A natural question that arises concerns the consistency between these two
levels of choice. More specifically, any societal preference profile on A induces
a preference profile on any set A of social choice functions, by ranking SCFs
in A according to the alternatives they choose from A. The question now is
which rules from among the available SCFs will choose themselves when they
are employed in choosing the choice rule from A .
If an SCF employed to make the social choice from A does not choose itself
at the induced preference profile on the set A of available SCFs, then this
phenomenon can be regarded as a lack of consistency on the part of this SCF
itself, as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Roughly speaking,
we call an SCF self-selective at a particular preference profile if it selects
itself at the induced profile from among any finite number of available SCFs.
Moreover, an SCF is said to be universally self-selective if it is self-selective
at each preference profile. Koray (2000) shows that a neutral and unanimous
SCF is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial.
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In this thesis, by using the same framework we introduce a new notion of
consistency for sets of social choice functions, called selection-closedness. Let
F be a set of SCFs, which can be considered as a constitution, capturing all
possible SCFs that can be used by a society. In our model, we also introduce
a different set A to represent the set of SCFs available to the society at the
time of the choice. If an SCF from F ∩A is employed to resolve the society’s
underlying choice problem, our new consistency criterion does not require any
more that the chosen SCF selects itself. The yardstick now becomes that it
chooses one of its “constitutionally prescribed companions” in F rather than
something in A \F , when it is used in choosing the choice function. In other
words, this new consistency based on the concept of self-selectivity refers to a
“group consistency”, rather than “individual consistency”. Roughly speaking,
we call a set F of SCFs selection-closed at a particular preference profile if
each member of F ∩ A selects a member of F ∩ A in the presence of all
members of A at the given profile. Moreover, a set F of SCFs is said to be
universally selection-closed if it is selection-closed at each preference profile.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In chapter 2 we introduce
the definitions of some basic notions including self-selectivity and selection-
closedness. This new notion of consistency is motivated in this chapter by
means of examples. In chapter 3, we introduce one of the main results of the
thesis, namely a characterization of selection-closedness. In chapter 4, we in-
troduce a weak version of selection-closedness and characterize the strictness
of right scoring correspondences via this concept. The last chapter summa-
rizes our main results, followed by some concluding remarks.
2
CHAPTER 2
SELECTION-CLOSEDNESS
2.1 Basic Notions
Let N be a finite non-empty society that will be fixed throughout the paper.
For each m ∈ N, where N denotes the the set of natural numbers as usual,
let Im = {1, . . . ,m} represents the set of alternatives of cardinality m and
denote the set of all linear orders on Im by L (Im). A social choice function
(SCF ) F is a function
F :
⋃
m∈N
L (Im)
N → N
such that for all m ∈ N and for all R ∈ L (Im)N , one has F (R) ∈ Im.
Firstly, we will define the neutrality of an SCF . Given m ∈ N and
R ∈ L (Im)N , for each permutation σm on Im, we define the permuted linear
order profile Rσm on Im as follows: for each agent i ∈ N , and for each k,
l ∈ Im, kRiσml if and only if σm(k)Riσm(l). An SCF F is said to be neutral
if and only if for each m ∈ N and each permutation σm on Im, one has
σm(F (Rσm)) = F (R)
for any profile R. We will denote the class of all neutral SCF s by G .
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We recapped the notion of neutrality to extend the domain of an SCF
to linear order profiles on an arbitrary finite set of alternatives A. Given
any finite set of alternatives A of cardinality m ∈ N, consider a bijection
µ : Im → A. Now, for any linear order profile L ∈ L (A)N , we define a new
linear order profile Lµ on Im such that for each agent i ∈ N , and for each k,
l ∈ Im, kLiµl if and only if µ(k)Liµ(l). Finally, we define F (L) = µ(F (Lµ)).
It is easy to see that, if F is neutral, for any two bijections µ, v : Im → A,
we have µ(F (Lµ)) = v(F (Lv)). That is, F (L) does not depend upon which
bijection µ is employed.
Secondly, we deal with the preferences of agents on any given non-empty
finite subset A of G . Now, from any linear order profile R ∈ L (Im)N , we
need to induce a preference profile on A . Given m ∈ N and R ∈ L (Im)N ,
we define a preference profile RA on A as follows: for each agent i ∈ N and
for each F1, F2 ∈ G , F1RiA F2 if and only if F1(R)RiF2(R) (i.e. agents rank
SCF s by only considering the outcomes that the SCF s choose at R). Note
that RA is a complete preorder profile on A , since any two different SCF s
may choose the same alternative at R. We will call RA the preference profile
on A induced by R.
By definition, the domain of a SCF is the union of linear order profiles on
Im for each m ∈ N. In order to make a choice from among the set of SCF ’s
in A , we must consider the linear order profiles that are generated by the
preference profile RA induced by R. Formally, given a complete preorder ρ on
a finite, non-empty set A, a linear order λ on A is compatible with by ρ if and
only if for all x, y ∈ A, xλy implies xρy. Now, given m ∈ N and R ∈ L (Im)N
and a non-empty finite subset A of G , we set L (A , R) = {L ∈ L (A )N | Li
is a linear order on A compatible with RiA for each i ∈ N} and call L (A , R)
the set of all linear order profiles on A induced by R.
Thirdly, we will define the self-selectivity notion for a neutral SCF . Given
F ∈ G , m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)N and a non-empty finite subset A of G with
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F ∈ A , we say that F is self-selective at R relative to A if and only if there
exists some L ∈ L (A , R) such that F = F (L). Moreover, F is self-selective
at R if and only if F is self-selective at R relative to any finite subset A
of G with F ∈ A . Lastly, F is universally self-selective if and only if F
is self-selective at each R ∈
⋃
m∈N
L (Im)
N . In Koray (2000), it is shown that
a neutral SCF is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial or
anti-dictatorial. We will denote the class of all neutral self-selective SCF s
by U .
Finally, we are ready to define selection-closedness. Given F ⊆ G , m ∈
N, R ∈ L (Im)N and a non-empty finite subset A of G , we say that F
is selection-closed at R relative to A if and only if for all F ∈ (F ∩ A ),
there exists some L ∈ L (A , R) such that F (L) ∈ F . Moreover, F is
selection-closed at R if and only if F is selection-closed at R relative to any
finite subset A of G . Lastly, F is universally selection-closed if and only if
F is selection-closed at each R ∈
⋃
m∈N
L (Im)
N .
Remark 1. By definition ∅ and G are universally selection-closed.
Remark 2. Any subset of U is universally selection-closed.
Remark 3. When |F | = 1, F is universally selection-closed if and only if
F ∈ F implies F is universally self-selective.
2.2 Example
Example 1. (This example is a modified version of an example in Koray
(2000)) Let N = {α, β, γ, δ} be the society endowed with a linear order profile
R over the set of alternatives I3 = {1, 2, 3}. Let F1 be the plurality function
with tie-breaking in favor of agent α. Given m ∈ N and R ∈ L (Im)N , an
outcome a ∈ Im is said to be a Condorcet winners at R if and only if, for
all b ∈ Im \ {a}, |{i ∈ N |aRib}| ≥ |N | /2 = 2 . In case that the set of
Condorcet winners at R is non-empty, let F2 choose the Condorcet winners
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most preferred by α if m is odd, and the Condorcet winners most preferred
by β if m is even; if there are no Condorcet winners at R, let F2 choose the
top ranked alternative by agent α at Rα. Let F3 be the Borda function with
tie-breaking in favor of agent γ. Moreover, let F4 will denote the dictatorial
SCF where γ is the dictator, i.e., F4 assigns the top alternative of R
γ to each
R ∈
⋃
m∈N
L (Im)
N . Note that F1, F2, F3 and F4 are neutral SCF s.
Now, let us consider the linear order profile R ∈ L (I3)N given through
the following table:
Rα Rβ Rγ Rδ
2 1 3 1
1 3 2 2
3 2 1 3
Let F = {F2, F3} and A = {F1, F2, F3}. We have F1(R) = 1 = F3(R) and
F2(R) = 2. The following table illustrates the complete preorder RA on A
induced by R where boxes indicates the indifference classes;
Rα Rβ Rγ Rδ
F2 F1, F3 F2 F1, F3
F1, F3 F2 F1, F3 F2
Note that, L (A , R), the set of all linear order profiles compatible with the
above complete preorder RA , has cardinality 2
4. Now, consider the linear
order profile L ∈ L (A , R) below;
Lα Lβ Lγ Lδ
F2 F3 F2 F3
F3 F1 F3 F1
F1 F2 F1 F2
Note that F2(L) = F2 and F3(L) = F3, so we can conclude that both F2 and
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F3 are self-selective at R relative to A . Since F = {F2, F3} we can conclude
that F is selection-closed at R relative to A .
Now consider the set A
′
= {F2, F3}. Since F3(R) = 1 and F2(R) = 2, the
set L (A
′
, R) has one element, say L1;
Lα1 L
β
1 L
γ
1 L
δ
1
F2 F3 F2 F3
F3 F2 F3 F2
Note that F2(L) = F3 6= F2 and F3(L) = F2 6= F3, indicating neither F2
nor F3 is self-selective at R relative to A
′
. But F2(L) = F3 ∈ F and
F3(L) = F2 ∈ F , so we say that F is selection-closed at R relative to A ′ .
Moreover, consider the set A
′′
= {F2, F4}. Since F4 is dictatoriality of
agent γ, we have F4(R) = 3. So the set L (A
′′
, R) has one element, say L2;
Lα2 L
β
2 L
γ
2 L
δ
2
F2 F4 F4 F2
F4 F2 F2 F4
Note that F2(L) = F4 6= F2, so F2 is not self-selective at R relative to A ′′ .
Also since F4 /∈ F , we can say that F is not selection-closed at R relative
to A
′′
. Lastly, we conclude that F is not universally selection-closed.
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CHAPTER 3
CHARACTERIZATION
3.1 Results
We will define a SCF Fα, that will be used in further discussion. Let α ∈ N
and let Dα, D−α ∈ G stand for dictatoriality and anti-dictatoriality of agent
α, respectively. Define Fα ∈ G , for each m ∈ N and at each R ∈ L (Im)N , as:
Fα(R) =
 Dα(R) if m is oddD−α(R) if m is even
Lemma 1. If F is a universally selection-closed subset of G and Fα ∈ F
for some α ∈ N , then F = G .
Proof. Assume not, i.e. G \F 6= ∅. Now, let C1 ⊆ G be the set of all SCFs
such that for any F1 ∈ G , F1 ∈ C1 if and only if F1 is the dictatoriality
of agent α for all odd m ∈ N and let C2 ⊆ G be the set of all SCFs such
that for any F2 ∈ G , F2 ∈ C2 iff there exists an odd m ∈ N such that F2
is not coincident with the dictatoriality of agent α for that m. Now, set Ci
= Ci ∩ (G \F ) for each i = 1, 2. Note that C1 ∪ C2 = G \F . We claim
that that C2 is empty. Assume not, and take any F2 ∈ C2. Since F2 /∈ F we
have F2 6= Fα. Also F2 ∈ C2 implies there exists an odd m ∈ N such that F2
is not the dictatoriality of agent α for that m. Since F2 6= Fα, there exists
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R ∈ L (Im)N such that F2(R) 6= Fα(R). Now, consider the set A = {Fα, F2}.
Note that Fα is dictatorial since m is odd. Thus for all L ∈ L (A , R), agent
α prefers Fα to F2 and since |A | = 2 we get Fα(L) = F2, contradicting with
the universally selection-closedness of F . Hence C2 = ∅; i.e. C2 ⊆ F .
Now, we claim that C1 is empty as well. Assume not, and take any
F1 ∈ C1. Let F2, F3 be SCFs such that F2 and F3 are dictatoriality of agent α
when m=3 and anti-dictatoriality of agent α when m=5 (construct F2, F3 for
all other m ∈ N such that F2 and F3 are neutral and different SCFs). Clearly
F2, F3 ∈ C2 ⊆ F . Now let m=5 and A = {F1, F2, F3}. Since F1 is dictatorial
and F2, F3 are anti-dictatorial, for any R and for any L ∈ L (A , R) F1 is the
top choice of agent α. Since |A |=3, we have F2(L) = F1, contradicting with
the universally selection-closedness of F . Hence C1 = ∅; i.e. C1 ⊆ F .
We have found that C1 = ∅ and C2 = ∅, contradicting G \F 6= ∅.
Theorem 1. Let F ⊆ G with F * U is universally selection-closed, then
F = G .
Proof. Assume not, i.e. there exists F1 ∈ (G \ U ) s.t. F1 ∈ F . Since F1
is not universally self-selective, there exists m ∈ N, A = {F1, F2, . . . , Fk}
and R ∈ L (Im)N such that F1 is not self-selective at R relative to A ; i.e.
for all L ∈ L (A , R), we have F1(L) 6= F1. We know that F is universally
selection-closed and F1 ∈ F , so there exists some L ∈ L (A , R) such that
F1(L) ∈ F . Since F1(L) 6= F1, there exists i ∈
{
2, . . . , k
}
s.t. Fi ∈ F .
Now, for each i ∈ {2, . . . , k} define Fi′ in the following way; when the
number of alternatives is equal to k or m, where k and m are determined
above, Fi
′
(R) is equal to Fi(R), otherwise Fi
′
(R) is equal to Fα, at each
R ∈ L (Im)N ; i.e.
Fi
′
(R) =
 Fi(R) if |Im| ∈
{
k,m
}
Fα(R) otherwise
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Now consider the set B =
{
F1, F2
′
, . . . , Fk
′
}
. By the same argument
above, there exists some L ∈ L (B, R) such that F1(L) ∈ F . But since, for
the values k and m, Fi
′
is same as Fi and F1 is not self-selective at R relative
to A , we have F1(L) 6= F1. So there exists some j ∈
{
2, . . . , k
}
such that
Fj
′ ∈ F .
Now, we will show that Fα is also an element of F . If Fj
′
= Fα, we
are done. Assume Fj
′ 6= Fα. But note that, Fj ′ and Fα can only differ
for the values k and m. For simplicity assume they differ for the value m.
Now consider the case when m is odd. Since Fj
′ 6= Fα, there exists some
R ∈ L (Im)N such that Fj ′(R) 6= Fα(R). Note that Fα(R) is the top choice
of agent α in R since m is odd. Now let t ∈ N be an odd number such that
t+2 6= m and t+2 6= k. Also letB1 =
{
Fj
′
, Fα, F1, . . . , Ft
}
where Fi ∈ G for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} s.t. Fi(R) 6= Fα(R). Now, for any L ∈ L (B1, R), we have
Fj
′
(L) = Fα since |B1| = t + 2 is odd and Fj ′ is the dictatoriality of agent
α. Since Fj
′ ∈ F and F is universally selection-closed, we have Fα ∈ F .
Now consider the case when m is even. Since Fj
′ 6= Fα, there exists some
R ∈ L (Im)N such that Fj ′(R) 6= Fα(R). Note that Fα(R) is the bottom
choice of agent α in R since m is even. Now let t ∈ N be an even number
such that t+ 2 6= m and t+ 2 6= k. Also let B1 =
{
Fj
′
, Fα, F1, . . . , Ft
}
where
Fi ∈ G for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} s.t. Fi(R) 6= Fα(R). Now, for any L ∈ L (B1, R),
we have Fj
′
(L) = Fα since |B1| = t+2 is even and Fj ′ is the anti-dictatoriality
of agent α. Since Fj
′ ∈ F and F is universally selection-closed, we have
Fα ∈ F .
Hence we observe that for any universally selection-closed subset F of
G s.t. F * U , we have Fα ∈ F , by previous lemma, we conclude that F =
G .
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CHAPTER 4
WEAKLY SELECTION-CLOSEDNESS
4.1 Preliminaries
In this chapter, we will define a weak version of the selection-closedness
and characterize a special class of scoring correspondences via this concept.
Given F ⊆ G , m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)N and a non-empty finite subset A
of G \ F , we say that F is weakly selection-closed at R relative to A if
and only if for each F ∈ F , there exists some A ′ ⊆ F with F ∈ A ′ such
that each F ′ ∈ A ′ is self-selective at R relative to A ∪ A ′. Moreover, F
is weakly selection-closed at R if and only if F is weakly selection-closed
at R relative to any finite subset A of G \ F . Lastly, F is universally
weakly selection-closed if and only if F is weakly selection-closed at each
R ∈
⋃
m∈N
L (Im)
N .
4.2 Examples
Example 2. Let CW (R) denotes the set of all Condorcet winners at each
R ∈ L (Im)N and let C :
⋃
m∈N
L (Im)
N → 2N be a social choice correspondence
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(SCC) defined for each m ∈ N and each R ∈ L (Im)N by,
C(R) =
 CW (R) if CW (R) 6= ∅Im if CW (R) = ∅,
Let C stands for the set of all singleton-valued refinements of C.
Let N = {α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6} be the society endowed with a linear order
profile R over the set of alternatives I3 = {1, 2, 3}. In case that the set of
Condorcet winner at R is non-empty, let F1 choose the Condorcet winner least
preferred by α1; if there are no Condorcet winners at R, let F1 choose the top
ranked alternative by agent α1 at R
α1 . Moreover, let F2 be the dictatoriality
of α4. Note that F1 is a singleton-valued refinement of C, i.e. F1 ∈ C .
Let R ∈ L (I3)N be the linear order profile represented by the table below:
Rα1 Rα2 Rα3 Rα4 Rα5 Rα6
1 1 2 2 1 3
3 3 1 1 3 2
2 2 3 3 2 1
Let A = {F2}. Note that we have F1(R) = 1, F2(R) = 2. Moreover, for any
Fj ∈ C , Fj(R) = 1 since CW (R) = 1. So, for any A ′ ⊆ C , with F1 ∈ A ′, the
following table illustrates the complete preorder RA ∪A ′ on A ∪A ′ induced
by R where boxes indicates the indifference classes;
Rα1 Rα2 Rα3 Rα4 Rα5 Rα6
Fj ∈ A ′ Fj ∈ A ′ F2 F2 Fj ∈ A ′ F2
F2 F2 Fj ∈ A ′ Fj ∈ A ′ F2 Fj ∈ A ′
Note that, for any linear order profile L ∈ L (A ∪ A ′, R), we have F2 ∈
CW (L). Since F1 choose the Condorcet winner least preferred by α1, we have
F1(L) = F2 for any L ∈ L (A ∪A ′, R). So, we can conclude that F1 is not
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self-selective at R relative to A ∪A ′ for any A ′ ⊆ C . Since F1 ∈ C , we can
conclude that C is not weakly selection-closed at R relative to A . Thus,
we conclude that C is not universally weakly selection-closed.
Example 3. Let P stands for the set of all singleton-valued refinements of
the Pareto Correspondence P . Let N = {α, β} be the society endowed with
a linear order profile R over the set of alternatives I2 = {1, 2}. Let F1 be
the dictatoriality of α if m is 2, and F1 choose the Pareto optimal outcome
which is least preferred by α otherwise. Note that F1 is a singleton-valued
refinement of P , i.e. F1 ∈ P.
Let R ∈ L (I2)N be the linear order profile represented by the table below:
Rα Rβ
1 2
2 1
Let A = {F2, F3} where F2(R) = F3(R) = 2 and F2, F3 ∈ G \P. Note that
F1(R) = 1. Moreover, for any Fj ∈ P, Fj(R) ∈ {1, 2} since P (R) = {1, 2}.
But, for any A ′ ⊆ P, with F1 ∈ A ′ and for any linear order profile L ∈
L (A ∪ A ′, R), we have either F2 ∈ P (L) or F3 ∈ P (L) or Fj ∈ P (L) for
some Fj ∈ A ′ with Fj 6= F1. For all cases, F1 is not the Pareto optimal
outcome which is least preferred by α. So, we have F1(L) 6= F1 for any
L ∈ L (A ∪ A ′, R). So, we can conclude that F1 is not self-selective at R
relative to A ∪A ′ for any A ′ ⊆P. Since F1 ∈P, we can conclude that P
is not weakly selection-closed at R relative to A . Thus, we conclude that
P is not universally weakly selection-closed.
Example 4. Let F ∈ G be a social choice function. Then F = G \ F is
universally weakly selection-closed.
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4.3 Results
To state our results we need further definitions. For any m ∈ N, a
score vector is an m-tuple s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ Rm with si ≥ si+1 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} and s1 > sm.
Given some alternative a ∈ Im and R ∈ L (Im)N , let σ(a,Rα) denote the
ranking of a in agent α’s ordering, i.e. σ(a,Rα) = |{b ∈ A|bRαa}|.
We say that F is a scoring correspondence if and only if for all m ∈ N
there exists a score vector s ⊆ Rm such that for any R ∈ L (Im)N we have,
F (R) =
{
a ∈ Im|
∑
α∈N
sσ(a,Rα) ≥
∑
α∈N
sσ(b,Rα) for any b ∈ Im
}
Denote the set of all scoring correspondences by S .
A scoring correspondence F ∈ S is said to be strict if and only if for all
m ∈ N and for the associated score vector s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ Rm we have
si > si+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
A scoring correspondence F ∈ S is said to be right-extendable if and only
if for any m,m+1 ∈ N and for the associated score vectors s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈
Rm and s′ = (s′1, . . . , s′m, s′m+1) ∈ Rm+1 we have s′i = si for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
A scoring correspondence F ∈ S is said to be left-extendable if and
only if for any m,m + 1 ∈ N and for the associated score vectors s =
(s1, . . . , sm) ∈ Rm and s′ = (s′1, . . . , s′m, s′m+1) ∈ Rm+1 we have s′i+1 = si
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Note that most common scoring rules, e.g., Borda, plurality, inverse plu-
rality, and any vote for k alternatives rule are either right-extendable or
left-extendable (Borda is both right-extendable and left-extendable).
Lemma 2. Let C ∈ S be a scoring correspondence and let C stands for
the set of all singleton-valued refinements of this correspondence. If C is
universally weakly selection-closed, then for any m ∈ N and for any R ∈
L (Im)N we have C(R) ⊆ P (R).
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Proof. Assume not, i.e. there exists an m ∈ N and R ∈ L (Im)N such that
C(R) * P (R). Let a ∈ C(R) and a /∈ P (R). Since a /∈ P (R), there
exists b ∈ Im which Pareto dominates a at R. Let F ∈ C be such that
F (R) = a and for other m′ ∈ N let F choose the most preferred alternative
by agent 1 with respect to C. Clearly F is a singleton valued refinement of
C. Now, let A = {G1, G2, . . . , Gm} ⊆ G \ C be such that Gi(R) = b for
all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Since C is universally weakly selection-closed, there
exist A ′ ⊆ C , with F ∈ A ′ such that F is self selective at R relative to
A ∪ A ′, i.e. there exists L ∈ L (A ∪ A ′, R) such that F (L) = F . But for
any L ∈ L (A ∪A ′, R), F is Pareto dominated by any Gj ∈ A . Moreover,
since C is a scoring correspondence and F (L) = F ∈ C(L), we must have
Gj ∈ C(L), i.e. there exists an alternative Gj ∈ C(L) which Pareto dominates
F at L. But, since the number of alternatives is strictly greater than m, F
must choose the most preferred alternative by agent 1 with respect to C, i.e.
F (L) 6= F , contradiction.
Theorem 2. A right-extendable scoring correspondence is strict if and
only if the set of all singleton valued refinements of the correspondence is
universally weakly selection-closed.
Proof. Let C be a right-extendable scoring correspondence. Assume C is
strict, then we will show that the set of all singleton-valued refinements of
the correspondence, C , is universally weakly selection-closed.
Take any m ∈ N and any R ∈ L (Im)N . First, we claim that C(R) ⊆
P (R). Suppose not, then there exists a ∈ C(R) and b ∈ Im such that b
Pareto dominates a. But, since C is strict, we must have
∑
α∈N sσ(b,Rα) >∑
α∈N sσ(a,Rα), contradicting with a ∈ C(R).
Now, take any F ∈ C and any A ⊆ G \ C . Since F (R) ∈ C(R) ⊆ P (R)
(by previous claim), there exists a linear order profile L ∈ L (A ∪ {F} , R)
such that F ∈ P (L). We will construct the set A ′ ⊆ C by replicating the role
of F in the linear order profile L. Consider the setA ′ = {F, F1} where F1 ∈ C
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and F (R) = F1(R). Now construct L
′ ∈ L (A ∪A ′, R) such that F1 is just
below F for all agents and the other alternatives remain in the same position
as in L. Since the correspondence C is right-extendable, strict and F ∈ P (L),
we have
∑
α∈N sσ(F,Lα) =
∑
α∈N sσ(F,L′α) but
∑
α∈N sσ(G,Lα) <
∑
α∈N sσ(G,L′α)
for all G ∈ A . By continuing in this way, we can find A ′ = {F, F1, . . . , Fk}
such that Fi ∈ C and F (R) = Fi(R) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Now, let Lˆ ∈
L (A ∪ A ′, R) such that ∑α∈N sσ(F,Lα) = ∑α∈N sσ(F,Lˆα) > ∑α∈N sσ(G,Lˆα)
for all G ∈ A . Since C is strict and F Pareto dominates all Fi’s for all i ∈
{1, . . . , k} at Lˆ we have C(Lˆ) = F . Since F is a singleton-valued refinement of
C, we have F (Lˆ) = F . For any F ′ ∈ A ′, we can construct Lˆ′ by changing the
position of F with F ′ in Lˆ such that F ′(Lˆ′) = F ′. Moreover, since F and A
are arbitrary, we can conclude that C is universally weakly selection-closed.
Conversely let C be a right-extendable scoring correspondence and as-
sume the set of all singleton-valued refinements of the correspondence, C , is
universally weakly selection-closed.
Take any m ∈ N and let s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ Rm be the score vector for
that m. We claim that if si = si+1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}, then for any
m′ ≥ m we must have sj = sj+1 for all j ∈ {i, . . . ,m′ − 1}. Suppose not, i.e.
si = si+1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} and there exists k ≥ i + 1 such that
sk > sk+1 (wlog assume k is the smallest integer with this property). Now,
let |N | be the number of agents such that |N |si > s1 + (|N | − 1)sk+1 and
consider the following profile.
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R1 R2 . . . R|N |−1 R|N |
a11 a12 . . . a1(|N |−1) a1(|N |)
a21 a22 . . . a2(|N |−1) a2(|N |)
...
...
...
...
...
a(i−1)1 a(i−1)2 . . . a(i−1)(|N |−1) a(i−1)(|N |)
bi bi . . . bi bi
bi+1 bi+1 . . . bi+1 bi+1
...
...
...
...
...
bk−1 bk−1 . . . bk−1 bk−1
bk bk . . . bk bk
...
...
...
...
...
Note that for any ajl, where j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}, l ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, we
have
∑
α∈N sσ(ajl,Rα) ≤ s1 + (|N | − 1)sk+1. Moreover, for any bj, where j ∈
{i, . . . , k}, we have ∑α∈N sσ(bj ,Rα) = |N |si. By construction we have |N |si >
s1 + (|N | − 1)sk+1, so we can conclude that {bi, bi+1} ⊆ C(R). But, bi+1 is
Pareto dominated by bi, contradicting the previous lemma. So, if si = si+1
for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}, then for any m′ ≥ m we must have sj = sj+1 for
all j ∈ {i, . . . ,m′ − 1}.
Now, assume C is not strict, then for somem ∈ N, there exists k+1, k+2 ∈
{1, . . . ,m − 1} such that sk+1 = sk+2. By previous claim, we know that for
any m′ ≥ m we have sj = sj+1 for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . ,m′ − 1}. Now, let
|N | = 5 and consider the following profile.
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
a a b1 c14 c15
c21 c22 b2 c24 c25
c31 c32 b3 c34 c35
...
...
...
...
...
ck1 ck2 bk ck4 ck5
b1 b1 a b1 b1
b2 b2 c(k+2)3 b2 b2
...
...
...
...
...
bk bk c(2k)3 bk bk
...
...
... a a
...
...
...
...
...
Note that for any cjl, where j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}, l ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, we have∑
α∈N sσ(cjl,Rα) ≤ s1 + (|N | − 1)sk+1 (note that cjl is not defined for all j and
l, but for simplicity in writing we will disregard this). Moreover, for any bj,
where j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have ∑α∈N sσ(bj ,Rα) ≤ s1 + (|N | − 1)sk+1. Lastly,
we have
∑
α∈N sσ(a,Rα) = 2s1 + (|N | − 2)sk+1. So C(R) = a, since s1 > sk+1.
Now, let F ∈ C and let A = {G1, G2, . . . Gk} such that Gj(R) = bj and
Gj ∈ G \ C . Moreover, for any Fj ∈ C , Fj(R) = a since C(R) = a. So,
for any A ′ ⊆ C , with F ∈ A ′, the following table illustrates the complete
preorder profile RA ∪A ′ on A ∪ A ′ induced by R where boxes indicates the
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indifference classes;
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5
Fj ∈ A ′ Fj ∈ A ′ G1 G1 G1
G1 G1 G2 G2 G2
G2 G2 G3 G3 G3
...
...
...
...
...
Gk Gk Fj ∈ A ′ Fj ∈ A ′ Fj ∈ A ′
Note that, for any linear order profile L ∈ L (A ∪A ′, R) and for any Fj ∈
A ′, we have
∑
α∈N sσ(Fj ,Lα) ≤ 2s1+3sk+1. Moreover, we have
∑
α∈N sσ(G1,Lα) =
3s1 + 2sk+1. Since s1 > sk+1, we have C(L) = G1. Since F is a singleton
valued refinement of C, we must have F (L) = G1. So, we can conclude that
F is not self-selective at R relative to A ∪A ′ for any A ′ ⊆ C . Since F ∈ C ,
we can conclude that C is not weakly selection-closed at R relative to A ,
contradiction.
Remark 4. If the set of all singleton valued refinements of a left-extendable
scoring correspondence is universally weakly selection-closed then the cor-
respondence is strict (this result is immediate from lemma 2). But there
exist some left-extendable scoring correspondences which are strict but the
set of all singleton valued refinements of the correspondence is not universally
weakly selection-closed.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we introduced the notion of selection-closedness as a new cri-
terion of consistency, and provided a characterization for the class of selection-
closed families of SCFs. Moreover, we also introduced a weaker version of
selection-closedness and characterized when right-extendable scoring corre-
spondences are strict via this concept. A nonempty-valued social choice cor-
respondence can be conceived as a constitutional construct which recommends
its singleton-valued refinements as SCFs that can be employed in resolving
particular social choice problems. We conjecture that most well-behaved con-
stitutional social choice correspondences can be classified via different weak
versions of selection-closedness. In particular, it might be interesting to look
into the class of Condorcet consistent rules to find the kinds of weakened
selection-closedness that fit the spirit of such rules.
Our work in this thesis also paves the way for the analysis of selection-
closedness in restricted domains. According to our definition of selection-
closedness, a member of a selection-closed family of SCFs must select a mem-
ber of its own family even when rivaled by extremely nonstandard functions
(such as Fα) that no modern society would think of employing. Such unnatu-
ral functions play an essential role in the proof of main theorem of the thesis
yielding an impossibility result. Therefore, the use of restricted domains for
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the SCFs seems worth being considered to escape from this pessimistic result.
Finally, if “self-selectiviy” is deemed to be a desirable property by a society,
different relaxations of universal selection-closedness may lead to further in-
teresting and valuable results.
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